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Abstract
The Term Structure of Bond Market Liquidity
Conditional on the Economic Environment:
An Analysis of Government Guaranteed Bonds
We analyze the term structure of illiquidity premiums as the difference between the yield
curves of two major bond segments that are both government guaranteed but differ in
their liquidity. We show that its characteristics strongly depend on the economic situation.
In crisis times, illiquidity premiums are higher with the largest increase for short-term
maturities. Moreover, their reaction to changes in fundamentals is only significant during
crises: premiums of all maturities depend on inventory risk, short maturities are highly
sensitive to liquidity preferences (flight-to-liquidity). Therefore, calibrating risk manage-
ment models in normal times underestimates illiquidity risk and misjudges term structure
effects.
JEL Classification: G01, G11, G12, G13
Keywords : bond liquidity, term structure of illiquidity premiums, regime-switching, fi-
nancial crisis, flight-to-liquidity
1. Introduction
It is consensus in the literature that a large part of the yield spread compensates investors
for the illiquidity of a bond (see e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005). However there
remain a number of important questions. Do illiquidity premiums behave substantially
differently in different economic periods? Or are they driven by the same economic de-
terminants independent of the economic environment? To what extent do such drivers
affect different parts of the term structure of illiquidity premiums in a different manner?
A deep understanding of the characteristics of illiquidity premiums is of key importance
given both the enormous and rapidly increasing size of bond markets and their role in the
economy as a major source of financing.
The majority of empirical studies of illiquidity premiums in bond markets analyze av-
erage effects both with respect to the economic environment and the bonds’ maturity.
Thus, they are silent on the above issues. To the best of our knowledge no previous
study analyzes the term structure of illiquidity premiums conditional on the economic
environment. We examine behavior and determinants of illiquidity premiums for different
maturities and allow explicitly for a regime dependent behavior. This distinguishes our
paper from the rest of the literature. Moreover, in contrast to our paper, many studies
suffer from the problem that empirically disentangling risk premiums due to illiquidity
from other systematic factors such as default risk is a tedious task and often subject to
strong assumptions.
Given the close link between liquidity and credit risk, an ideal setting would be to study
the differences between zero coupon yield curves of two bond segments fulfilling three
requirements: First, both segments only differ in their liquidity. Second, in each segment,
there are a sufficient number of bonds available over a long observation period. Third,
the bonds in each segment are completely homogeneous.
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German government bonds (BUNDs) and government guaranteed bonds issued by the
German federal agency Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) provide a near-ideal set-
ting. They constitute major bond market segments in the eurozone with a sufficient
number of bonds from both issuers in all maturity segments. Since KfW bonds are ex-
plicitly guaranteed by the German government, they bear effectively the same default
risk as government bonds. However, they are clearly less liquid. This clean environment
allows us to isolate the term structures of illiquidity premiums. Moreover, we can study
their drivers conditional on the state of the economy based on 15 years of data from 1996
to 2010. In order to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the nature
of illiquidity premiums, we study their term structures with Hamilton’s regime-switching
approach.
Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, the regime-switching approach applied
on an autoregressive model of illiquidity premiums of different maturities identifies the
1998 bailout of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), the period after the burst of
the dot-com bubble as well as the financial crisis starting in summer 2007 as liquidity
stress periods in the European bond market.
Second, we find that the term structure of illiquidity premiums varies over time and is
strongly dependent on the general financial and economic situation. In normal times, the
average illiquidity premium measured as the extra yield to maturity of an illiquid agency
bond compared to a liquid government bond is around 15 bps. This premium nearly
doubles in times of stress for all maturity segments but the increase is most prevalent
at the short end. Thus, term structures of illiquidity premiums in times of crisis are
often strongly downward sloping as predicted by theoretical models when probabilities to
sell are above their long-term mean (see Ericsson and Renault, 2006) or when aggregate
liquidity shocks are more likely (see Feldhütter, 2012).
Third, we find that none of our economic drivers plays a major role in explaining premi-
ums in normal times. In contrast, factors accounting for the degree of bond illiquidity and
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factors accounting for preferences for liquidity are important in periods of stress. While
option-implied interest rate volatilities which proxy for the degree of illiquidity have sig-
nificant explanatory power for all maturity segments, preferences for liquidity drive the
short end only. This finding is consistent with the clearly higher short-term premiums
and can be explained with flight-to-liquidity periods that coincide with stress periods.
An increased demand for short-term and highly liquid securities within these periods
leads first to a strongly increased level of illiquidity premiums and second to a stronger
influence of effects stemming from liquidity demand. If we estimated our model uncondi-
tionally, statistical significances would be the same as for the crisis regime, but economic
significances would be weak. Thus, an unconditional estimation would both misjudge
economic drivers and contradict theoretical models predicting a close connection between
systematic factors and illiquidity premiums (see e.g., Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Our
regime-switching approach therefore helps to reconcile theory and empirical findings.
Overall, the regime-switching nature of the term structure of illiquidity premiums docu-
mented in this study goes well together with the theoretical insights of Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) that the impact of changes in fundamentals on illiquidity is significantly
stronger when funding is scarce and the system is in stress. This implies that calibrating
e.g., risk management models in normal times, where illiquidity premiums are largely
invariant to changes in fundamentals, heavily underestimates the systematic component
of liquidity risk. Moreover, preferences for liquidity appear only in short-term premiums
making it worthwhile to incorporate term structure effects.
Despite the importance of these relations, empirical research in this area has been limited.
Empirical evidence that liquidity effects in bond markets are conditional on the state of
the economy includes the important papers of Brunnermeier (2009), Dick-Nielsen, Feld-
hütter, and Lando (2012), and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010). While Brunner-
meier (2009) and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2012) clearly document a different
behavior of liquidity during crisis and non-crisis times, Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath
(2010) explicitly identify two liquidity regimes and document the regime-dependent im-
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portance of liquidity betas. Given their focus on corporate bonds, all these studies suffer
from the separation between liquidity and credit risk. Moreover, the term structure of
illiquidity premiums is outside the scope of these papers.
Some recent research focuses on the term structure of illiquidity premiums. Longstaff
(2004) studies yield differences between Treasuries and Refcorp bonds. He finds a pos-
itive influence of changes in the amount of funds held in money market mutual funds
on short-term illiquidity premiums, whereas medium-term premiums increase when con-
sumer confidence declines. Both effects can be interpreted in the way that an increased
wariness to bear risk increases the premium of holding an illiquid bond. Kempf, Korn, and
Uhrig-Homburg (2012) estimate the term structure of illiquidity premiums for German
Pfandbriefe. They find a positive influence of short- and long-term liquidation needs on
the respective illiquidity premiums, the former proxied by asset market volatilities, the
latter directly linked to a deteriorating economic outlook. Both studies do not pursue a
conditional approach, rather they analyze ‘average’ effects over the whole business cycle.
Finally, Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov (2011) study the term structure of Treasury
market illiquidity. Although their focus is on bond market trading cost measured via bid-
ask spreads instead of yield differentials, their findings of increasing illiquidity in recessions
across all maturities with the increase being especially pronounced for short-term bonds
is pretty much consistent with our insights on the premium side.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides details on how
we extract the term structure of illiquidity premiums. In Section 3, we study the term
structure of illiquidity premiums in a regime-switching model and analyze economic de-
terminants of illiquidity premiums of different maturities conditional on the economic




We extract the illiquidity premium by estimating the zero coupon yield curves of two bond
market segments that differ only in their liquidity: highly liquid BUNDs and more illiquid
bonds guaranteed by the German government but issued by the German federal agency
KfW. The interpretation of the KfW-BUND bond yield spread curve as the term structure
of illiquidity premiums depends on two key assumptions: that federal agency bonds are
less liquid than government bonds and that credit risk in both segments is exactly the
same. We describe first our data set, the approach to extract the term structure of
illiquidity premiums, and the resulting shapes of illiquidity premiums and then provide
support that the KfW-BUND spread can indeed be attributed to liquidity differences.
2.1 DATA, TERM STRUCTURE ESTIMATION, AND EVOLUTION OF PREMIUMS
Our data set consists of weekly closing prices for BUNDs and KfW bonds from the Frank-
furt Stock exchange from February 14th, 1996 to September 29th, 2010. During this
period, there are always a sufficient number of bonds from both issuers in all maturity seg-
ments available. We only include those KfW bonds that are well comparable to BUNDs:
plain vanilla fixed coupon bonds with annual coupon payments that are exchange-tradable
and denominated in Euro. Table I gives an overview of all bonds in our sample.
[Insert Table I about here.]
We estimate the term structure of zero coupon yields of BUNDs and KfW bonds using
the Nelson and Siegel (1987) approach. Within this approach, the entire term structure
information at time t is condensed in four parameters (β0,t, β1,t, β2,t, τt). The zero coupon
yield of bond class i ∈ {BUND,KfW} at time t for time to maturity T is given as

































To make the β-factors of both BUNDs and KfWs directly comparable and to restrict the
shape of the term structure of illiquidity premiums to shapes allowed within the Nelson-
Siegel approach, we further impose τBUNDt = τ
KfW
t = τt (see also Nelson and Siegel, 1987
and Diebold and Li, 2006 who restrict τ to be constant over time t).











is carried out for each week t separately by standard OLS techniques: We minimize the
sum of squared differences between observed and theoretical Nelson-Siegel yields for all
































where the theoretical yield yldth,ij,t of bond j from bond class i is obtained by discounting all
its future cash flows with yit(T ). To put equal weights on both segments for the estimation
of the common τt, we weight the sum of squared yield differences with the inverse of the
number of bonds N it in the respective bond class. As in Schich (1997), who developed
the estimation procedure for the benchmark yield curve employed by the German central
bank, we exclude bonds with time to maturity less than three months since for them small
errors in the price would translate to large yield errors. Fitting errors are presented in
Table II. Root mean square errors (RMSE) are in the same order of magnitude for all
maturities and both segments and there is no systematic bias of yield curve estimates.
[Insert Table II about here.]
The term structure of illiquidity premiums at time t is then obtained as the difference
between the two estimated Nelson-Siegel curves
illiqt(T ) = y
KfW
t (T ) − y
BUND
t (T ). (3)
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To get a first impression on different shapes of the term structure, Figure 1 shows the
evolution of the two, five, and eight year illiquidity premiums. There are clearly different
forms over time. So for example from mid 2000 until mid 2001, an increasing term struc-
ture can be observed, whereas the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 are characterized
by U-shaped term structures. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the term structure
becomes strongly decreasing. On average, the term structure of illiquidity premiums is
slightly U-shaped with premiums of 21.6 bps for two years, 17.9 bps for five years, and
18.3 bps for eight years time to maturity.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
Average illiquidity premiums are similar in magnitude to the 9 to 40 bps range found
in previous studies of US and European bond market liquidity.1 Regarding the shape of
the term structure, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find a declining one for US Treasury
notes compared to more liquid Treasury bills in 1987, whereas Longstaff (2004) presents
evidence for a U-shaped, and Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) for a hump-shaped profile.2 Our
findings help to reconcile these conflicting outcomes as the shape of the term structure of
illiquidity premiums depends on the general financial and economic situation. In contrast
to Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg (2012) who also observe varying forms for the
Pfandbrief segment, our homogeneous data set of bonds from only two issuers allows us to
rule out unobserved changing intra-segment liquidity differences as a possible explanation.
1Longstaff (2004) finds an illiquidity premium of 9 to 16 bps for zero coupon strips derived from six
long-term Refcorp bonds for the period 1991 to 2001 and Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) find on average
20.4 bps for German Jumbo Pfandbriefe for the years 2000 to 2001. Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg
(2012) report an average illiquidity premium between 29 bps for one year and 40 bps for 15 years of time
to maturity for the relatively heterogeneous segment of German Pfandbriefe from 2000 to 2007.
2Liu, Longstaff, and Mandell (2006) and de Jong and Driessen (2006) filter premiums for illiquidity
risk out of swap and corporate bond spreads. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando (2012) estimate a
liquidity component as a fraction of corporate bond spreads. All three papers find an increasing term
structure.
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2.2 THE KFW-BUND YIELD SPREAD AND LIQUIDITY MEASURES
In this section, we argue that both KfW bonds and BUNDs are virtually identical in all
relevant characteristics except their liquidity. We show that KfW bonds are less liquid
than corresponding government bonds and present time-series relations between illiquidity
premiums and liquidity measures. Thus, the KfW-BUND spread can be attributed to
liquidity differences (see also Schwarz, 2010; Monfort and Renne, 2010).
KfW is a promotional bank owned by the German government and federal states. It was
founded in 1948 to further the reconstruction of the German economy after World War
II. Today, it serves as the leading financier of small and medium size enterprises, provides
credit to retail customers for subsidized projects (e.g., improving energy efficiency of
buildings), and acts on behalf of the German government on special tasks. All KfW bonds
are guaranteed by the German government and thus bear effectively the same default risk
as government bonds. This is recognized e.g., by the US economic magazine ‘Global
Finance’ honoring KfW as the world’s safest bank in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Besides
their identical credit risk, KfWs and BUNDs are zero weighted in determining capital
requirements within the Basel regulations, and are also identical in their tax treatment.
In contrast, the two segments differ in their liquidity due to the about eleven times
higher outstanding total volume and the more than three times higher average issue size
of BUNDs compared to KfW bonds (see Table I). Note also that although KfWs and
BUNDs are both accepted by the European Central Bank (ECB) as collateral for repo
transactions, ECB divides securities in liquidity categories. KfWs are in the second highest
category, whereas BUNDs are in the highest.3
3This leads to small additional haircuts for KfWs of up to 2% for the longest maturities. KfWs
and BUNDs are both accepted by the Federal Reserve for discount window loans with the same margin
haircuts. The Bank of England accepts KfWs only as ‘wider collateral’ which can be used for long-term
open market operations and the discount window facility, whereas BUNDs are accepted for all monetary
policy operations.
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To provide further support that illiquidity premiums are driven by liquidity differences
between the two segments, we analyze the time-series relation between illiquidity premi-
ums and corresponding liquidity measures for three maturity segments in more detail. We
obtain relative bid-ask spreads from all contributors providing quotations in Bloomberg
and compute the average bid-ask spread for each bond and each date. To calculate a time
to maturity dependent measure, we estimate a linear relation between the duration of the
bond and the bid-ask spread for each segment and each date. With the estimated ‘term
structure of bid-ask spreads’ we are able to aggregate the information from all bonds of
a segment in maturity dependent bid-ask spreads similarly as for the estimation of the
term structure of illiquidity premiums. Bid-ask quotations are available only since 1999
for a majority of KfW bonds, two-sided quotes for bonds of durations less than two years
are only available after August 22nd, 2001 on a continuous basis.
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the two, five, and eight year illiquidity premiums over
time together with the respective quoted bid-ask spread differences. For all three maturity
segments, the figure shows a remarkable connection between bid-ask spread differences and
illiquidity premiums. Their unconditional correlation is 0.89 for two years, 0.85 for five,
and 0.84 for eight years maturity. These findings provide clear and consistent evidence in
favor of liquidity-driven yield spreads.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
To further rule out the possibility that the KfW-BUND yield spread is due to a convenience
yield for BUNDs, we compare the average illiquidity premium with the spread between
the general collateral repo rate (EUREPO) and BUND. In the time period for which
EUREPO is available (since March 2002), the average difference between the day count
adjusted EUREPO twelve months and the one year BUND rate is with 8.5 bps less than
one fourth of the average one year illiquidity premium during this time period of 36.8
bps. Looking only at the financial crisis, the fraction of EUREPO compared to the total
KfW-BUND spread is even slightly smaller. As EUREPO is an offer rate, one fourth
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should therefore be an absolute upper bound of the non-liquidity related fraction of the
illiquidity premium.
Finally, since BUNDs and KfW bonds are traded mainly over the counter and on electronic
trading platforms like MTS, we test whether there are discrepancies between our exchange
data and data from other platforms like MTS (for which we have one month of data) or
Bloomberg Consensus quotes and do not find any fundamental difference.
3. Term Structure Dynamics: A Conditional Approach
We are now ready to study the term structure of illiquidity premiums in a regime-switching
model and to analyze economic determinants of illiquidity premiums of different maturities
conditional on the economic environment.
3.1 MOTIVATION
As can be seen in Figure 1, the behavior of illiquidity premiums seems to be heavily
affected by the financial crisis. Illiquidity premiums of all maturities strongly increase
in summer 2007 and reach all time highs after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.4 In the
literature, we find both theoretical and empirical evidence for a regime-switching behavior
of bond prices with respect to liquidity. So Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010) analyze
the influence of illiquidity on returns of corporate bonds of different rating classes with a
Markov regime-switching model. They find that in the stress regime, prices of investment
grade bonds rise and prices of speculative grade bonds fall with deteriorating liquidity
4The regime-switching behavior is supported by looking at Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests.
They reject the non-stationary hypothesis for the time period before the beginning of the financial crisis
in June 2007 for our three time series of illiquidity premiums, whereas if we include the whole time
period, non-stationarity can only be rejected for two and five year illiquidity premiums. Additionally,
Chow tests (see e.g., Candelon and Lütkepohl, 2001) reject the null hypothesis of parameter constancy in
autoregressive models of different lag length for a wide range of possible break dates and all three series.
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(flight-to-liquidity). In contrast, there is no significant effect of illiquidity on bond returns
in normal times. In a different empirical framework, Füss, Gehrig, and Rindler (2012)
find that risk perception regarding liquidity risk significantly changed due to the financial
crisis. Furthermore, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) find high innovations of illiquidity (with
the Amihud, 2002, measure) for American stocks during periods anecdotally characterized
as liquidity crises (e.g., the Russian default and LTCM crisis).
There is also a small but growing body of research predicting a regime-switching behavior
of liquidity from a theoretical point of view. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) propose a
model where they relate an asset’s liquidity to the margin requirements of market makers.
If funding becomes scarce e.g., due to macroeconomic shocks, margin requirements are
increasing which affects the market makers’ ability to provide liquidity. The deteriorat-
ing liquidity in turn leads to higher asset volatility, which again leads to higher margin
requirements. These liquidity spirals result in multiple fragile liquidity equilibria in crisis
times. In a similar spirit, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2007) propose a model relating tighter
risk-management and deteriorating liquidity. They predict a multiplier effect, which ex-
plains sudden dry ups of liquidity after initial losses. Another factor could be an increased
risk aversion during crisis times, which would also lead to higher illiquidity premiums (see
e.g., Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath, 2010). Increasing risk premiums in times of crisis
when intermediaries are constrained in raising capital can be observed in the model of He
and Krishnamurthy (2010). All of this would lead to a higher level and a higher volatility
of illiquidity premiums during crisis times.
Based on these considerations there are good reasons to expect valuable insights from
a regime-switching approach: a small number of separated regimes is reasonable and
the system seems to alternate between them. Ignoring a possible different behavior of
illiquidity premiums in different economic regimes can in the best case only lead to results
describing ‘average’ characteristics. Our study is the first to allow explicitly for a regime
dependent behavior of illiquidity premiums and their determinants.
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3.2 CRISIS IDENTIFICATION
We use a Markov regime-switching model for crisis identification which has been first
proposed by Hamilton (1989). In contrast to our approach, most authors rely on excep-
tional events to identify crises (see e.g., Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam, 2012;
Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005), but this procedure is somewhat arbitrary
especially for the crisis end date (see Barrell et al., 2010 for a short discussion of this
topic). The main advantage of the Markov approach is the endogenous crisis identifica-
tion. So essentially the data tell us, when the system is likely to be in the stress regime.
To validate the crisis identification, we relate our endogenously derived stress probabilities
to macroeconomic and financial sector variables typically used to identify financial crises.
Since crisis identification is a crucial step in our analysis, we also check the robustness of
our results using exogenously specified crisis periods in Section 4..
To analyze the different behavior of illiquidity premiums conditional on crisis and non-
crisis times, we estimate a two-regime AR model for two, five, and eight year illiquidity

































+ ǫLongs,t , (6)
where the state s ∈ {1, 2} follows a homogeneous Markov chain with constant transition
probabilities
P (st = 1|st−1 = 1) = p1,1,
P (st = 2|st−1 = 2) = p2,2.
(7)
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We select this flexible variance-covariance matrix to allow for heteroskedasticity between
the two regimes. Also, correlations of the error terms of different segments can be regime-
switching. The model is estimated along the lines described in Hamilton (1990) and
Hamilton (1994) using the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to maximize the
log-likelihood function.
Table III gives the estimation results of Model (4)-(8) with p = 3 lags which is suggested
by both Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC). The large and significant values of the lagged parameters for all maturities and
both regimes show the high persistence of illiquidity premiums over time. Figure 3 shows
the average term structure of illiquidity premiums in both regimes. A clear separation
in the two regimes can be recognized. Whereas in the non-stress regime (regime 1), on
average the extra yield to maturity of an illiquid KfW bond compared to the liquid BUND
is around 15 bps, this illiquidity premium nearly doubles in the stress regime (regime 2).
Additionally, the standard deviation of the innovations is about two to three times larger
in the stress regime. The shape of the term structure is slightly U-shaped in both regimes,
but the decreasing part is much more pronounced in the stress regime due to large short-
term illiquidity premiums. This result can be explained with flight-to-liquidity periods
that coincide with financial crises. Within these periods, investors seek for short-term
and extremely liquid bonds as a safe haven to temporarily store their funds.5
5We check the validity of these results by looking at the unbiasedness of our yield curve estimates
for the bond with the shortest maturity: In the stress (normal times) regime, the yield of the shortest
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The estimation of the parameters delivers the probability of the system being in the stress
regime for each date in the sample. This probability is plotted in Figure 4. The stress
regime can be clearly associated with economic events that might be causal for poor
liquidity. So the 1998 bailout of LTCM, the period after the burst of the dot-com bubble
as well as the financial crisis starting in summer 2007 are all identified as stress periods.
[Insert Table III about here.]
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
To check the reliability of our crisis identification, we formally establish the connection
between the liquidity stress regime and economic and financial sector variables typically
associated with stress periods (see e.g., Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath, 2010). Accord-
ingly, we regress the probability of being in the stress regime on the following variables:
(i) Recession Dummy Germany: This dummy variable equals 1 if the observation date
lies within at least two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth in Germany
(seasonally and working-day adjusted data from Deutsche Bundesbank).
(ii) Negative Return DAX: Dummy variable that equals 1 if the three month return of the
German stock market index DAX is below the one standard deviation bound calculated
from realized five minute returns of the DAX from 1996 to September 2010 (data from
Deutsche Börse).
(iii) VDAX New: Implied volatility of the DAX for the next 30 days calculated from
options on futures on the stock market index (data from Deutsche Börse).
maturity BUND is on average 7.4 (3.2) bps below the estimated BUND yield curve, whereas the respective
KfW bond lies 6.5 (2.2) bps above the KfW yield curve. This suggests an even stronger flight to the
highly liquid BUND with the shortest time to maturity and means that we underestimate the illiquidity
premium (and the increase of the illiquidity premium in the stress regime) at the very short end of the
term structure.
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(iv) ZEW German Expectation: ZEW indicator of economic sentiment that measures the
expectations of approximately 400 surveyed financial analysts regarding the future eco-
nomic development (data from the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)).
(v) TED Spread: Spread between the unsecured three month USD Libor and the three
month T-Bill rate. This spread measures the uncertainty in the banking system (see e.g.,
Brunnermeier, 2009) (data from Bloomberg).
(vi) Credit Spread: Spread between the yields of one year AA rated corporate bonds and
BBB rated corporate bonds. It is assumed that credit spreads widen in times of economic
stress (data from Bloomberg for the US bond market since European data only becomes
available after 2001).
(vii) Capitalization of the Banking System: Yearly change in the total assets of the bank-
ing system (only commercial banks) divided by the total financial assets of households and
non-financial corporations (data from Deutsche Bundesbank). This measure is motivated
by the connection between the ability of banks to provide funding and market liquidity
(see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
(viii) Systemic Stress : Indicator of systemic stress in the financial system developed by
Holló, Kremer, and Duca (2011) (data from the ECB).
The estimation results in Table IV show a clear connection between economic variables
typically associated with economic stress and the probability of being in the stress regime.
The OLS estimates are all significant in the expected direction. So a recession in Germany,
the three month DAX return being below the one standard deviation bound, an increased
implied volatility, large credit spreads and TED spreads as well as a high level of systemic
stress all indicate a higher probability of being in the low liquidity stress regime. On
the other hand, a more positive economic outlook and an increased capitalization of the
banking system lead to lower stress probabilities.6 In the univariate regressions, the large
6However, the effect of the increased capitalization of the banking system only becomes significant if
we control for implied volatility. A possible reason for this is that increased volatility might lead to higher
capital requirements which in turn lead to an increased capitalization. So an increased capitalization is
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explanatory power of systemic stress for the probability to be in the stress regime could be
expected since this indicator is specifically designed to identify financial crises. Together
with the anecdotal evidence from Figure 4, this analysis confirms the capability of our
approach to identify stress periods.
[Insert Table IV about here.]
3.3 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE TERM STRUCTURE OF ILLIQUIDITY
In this section, we analyze economic drivers of illiquidity premiums of different maturities
conditional on crisis and non-crisis times. We select measures based on the theoretical
and empirical literature regarding the determinants of illiquidity and illiquidity premiums.
As illiquidity premiums are the extra yield investors receive for holding an illiquid bond,
it is reasonable to hypothesize that they depend first on the degree of illiquidity of the
respective bond and second on the preferences for liquidity of the marginal investor.
We account for the degree of illiquidity first with a measure of general market liquidity and
second by directly looking at liquidity differences between KfW bonds and BUNDs. For
the measure of general market liquidity, we follow the inventory holding cost paradigm
dating back to Demsetz (1968), Stoll (1978), and Ho and Stoll (1981) and empirically
validated e.g., by Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Bollen, Smith, and Whaley (2004)
for the stock market and by Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov (2011) for the bond
market. This paradigm states that increased asset volatility leads to larger bid-ask spreads
to compensate the market makers for the incurred inventory risk and in turn should lead
to increased illiquidity premiums (see e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). To proxy
for the inventory risk of market makers, we use option implied interest rate volatility.
Since coupon bonds are very similar to swaps in their cash flow structure, we use implied
swaption volatilities from Bloomberg. They are derived according to Black’s (1976) model
also an indicator for increased volatility which would lead to contrary impacts on the stress probability
if we do not control for volatility.
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from swaption prices with an option tenor of three months and a swap tenor of one, two,
three, four, five, seven, and ten years. Since Black volatilities are heavily negatively
correlated with the level of interest rates, but we do not want to incorporate interest rate
effects, we orthogonalize the seven volatility series with the three-month Euribor.7 We
use the first principal component of the seven orthogonalized series as our measure for
inventory risk.
Liquidity differences between the two bond segments are proxied by differences in the
outstanding volume that is freely available for trading. For this, we construct measures
of the tradable volume of the representative two, five, and eight year KfW bond relative
to the tradable volume of the corresponding German government bond. These measures
are calculated in three steps. First, we adjust for the effect that the tradable volume and
liquidity of a bond tends to decrease over its life due to the fact that the outstanding
volume is absorbed by buy-and-hold investors (aging effect, see e.g., Warga, 1992). Ejsing
and Sihvonen (2009) estimate for German government bonds that the trading volume
of an issue declines by eight percent each year. Therefore, we multiply the outstanding
volume of each bond with e−0.08·Age of the issuet . Second, we aggregate the tradable volume
of all outstanding bonds from each segment into the tradable volume of three represen-
tative bonds (with two, five, and eight years time to maturity).8 Third, we divide the
tradable volume of the representative KfW bond of each maturity by the tradable vol-
ume of the respective German government bond. As can be seen in Table V, the average
7The unconditional correlation between the seven implied volatility series and the three-month Eu-
ribor lies between -0.574 and -0.669. For the time before the introduction of the Euro, we use Deutsche
Mark swaption volatilities and orthogonalize them with the three-month Fibor (Frankfurt interbank
offered rate).
8More precisely, we weight the volume of each bond with the influence it has on the zero coupon
yield of the respective maturity. To measure this influence, we calculate the sensitivity of a small yield
change of this bond on the zero coupon yield curve. The advantage of this weighting scheme is the
independence from arbitrarily selected time to maturity bucket bounds. Additionally, it minimizes the
time series variation resulting from bonds changing buckets.
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tradable volume of the representative KfW bond is about 20% of the volume of its BUND
counterpart.
The selection of a measure for liquidity preferences is conceptually more difficult. On the
one hand, it is obvious that future liquidation needs positively influence preferences for
liquidity. On the other hand, it is likely that market wide risk premiums also impact the
extra yield investors demand for holding an illiquid bond (see e.g., Gârleanu and Pedersen,
2011). As a proxy for future liquidation needs, we select the benchmark volatility index
for the German stock market (VDAX New). As Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg (2012)
argue, implied volatility is a measure of the expected amount of information flowing into
the market. It is likely that trading needs increase with a growing information flow.
VDAX New is calculated by Deutsche Börse from options on futures on the DAX. As
a further measure of financial uncertainty, which positively influences future liquidation
needs, we use the TED spread. Brunnermeier (2009) points out, that in times of higher
uncertainty in the banking system, the risk of unsecured loans rises which in turn leads
to higher LIBOR rates. Additionally, in times of higher uncertainty the value of first
rate collateral rises pushing down T-Bill rates and widening the TED spread further.9
As a proxy for market wide risk premiums or required returns, we select the dividend
yield of the German stock market index DAX. In his 2011 Presidential Address to the
American Finance Association, Cochrane (2011) points out that variations in the market
wide dividend yield reflect changes in risk premiums rather than changes in future dividend
growth. The dividend yield is calculated by Bloomberg under the assumption, that for
all 30 constituents of the DAX, realized dividends in the year before the observation date
are paid as an infinite annuity. It is available after May 7th, 1997. Both TED spread
and VDAX New, besides being measures for uncertainty, are also expected to be sensitive
to an increase in risk premiums. Additionally, the dividend yield is supposed to rise in
uncertain times (with high future liquidation needs) due to declining stock prices. Thus,
9The TED spread as a measure of uncertainty, tightness, or fear in the banking system is also employed
e.g., by Nyborg and Östberg (2010) and Kucuk (2009).
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a separation of liquidation needs and risk premiums is not possible and we therefore use
the first principal component of the three series as our measure for liquidity preferences.
[Insert Table V about here.]
To analyze the impact of our economic factors on the term structure of illiquidity premi-
ums conditional on the two regimes, we augment the AR Model (4)-(8) with exogenous
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where the state st ∈ {1, 2} follows a homogeneous Markov chain as specified in (7) and




s,t ) is multi-normally distributed with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix as defined in (8). As in the Markov regime-switching
AR model, we set p = 3 and estimate the model with the EM algorithm to maximize the
log-likelihood. Due to the availability of data for our exogenous variables, the observation
period is now May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.10
Table VI presents our main results concerning the explanatory variables. First, inventory
risk proxied by implied swaption volatilities heavily influences illiquidity premiums of all
10The derived stress probabilities are very similar to the ones calculated from the estimation of Model
(4)-(8) (the average absolute difference between the two probability series is only 2.6%) and they also
expose the same crisis events (LTCM, burst of dot-com bubble, and financial crisis)
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maturities in the crisis regime, whereas in normal times, there is no significant influence.
In Table VII, we analyze the regime-switching behavior of the sensitivities. The null
hypotheses are that the influences of the economic factors on illiquidity premiums are









1,s=2 ) can be clearly rejected for medium- and long-term
premiums. The more important influence of inventory risk in crisis times is consistent
with Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) argument that it is much more costly for market
makers to put aside the additional capital required to cover potential losses on their
inventory positions when funding is scarce. Thus, they cut back liquidity provision more
strongly during crisis times, when inventory risk increases.11 To illustrate the economic
significance, we look at a one standard deviation shock on inventory risk. Such a shock
leads to an increase e.g., of the medium-term premium of about 2.7 bps, which is more
than one tenth of the average premium in the stress regime.
[Insert Table VI about here.]
[Insert Table VII about here.]
Second, liquidity differences, proxied by the fraction of tradable volume of the represen-
tative KfW bond compared to its BUND counterpart, only play a minor role. Although a
large tradable volume of the KfW seems to significantly decrease the five year illiquidity
premium, the economic significance is weak (a one standard deviation shock has only an
impact of 0.7 bps). A similar result is also observed for the Pfandbrief market by Kempf,
Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg (2012). A possible explanation the authors provide is that
perceived liquidity differences do not change with each issued bond but are rather static.
11An alternative explanation is that the sensitivity of illiquidity premiums regarding a changing liquid-
ity increases in crisis times. This is observed for the corporate bond market by Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter,
and Lando (2012) for the recent subprime crisis. Van Landschoot (2008) finds that the effect of changes
to bid-ask spreads on corporate bond spreads is higher when liquidity is low.
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Another explanation could be that the value investors attribute to liquidity increases with
less available liquid BUNDs due to the law of supply and demand (see Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2010). If this is the case, there are two opposite effects from an
increase of the BUND volume. First, the relative liquidity of KfW bonds decreases lead-
ing to an increase in illiquidity premiums. Second, the value of liquidity decreases which
should decrease illiquidity premiums.
Third, coefficients on preferences for liquidity clearly document that investors concentrate
on short-term bonds when disengaging from illiquid securities in crisis times. The effect
is both statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation shock to the
preference variable leads to an impact on the two year illiquidity premium of 3.1 bps in
the crisis regime. This is about 10% of the average premium in this regime. Moreover,
the regime-switching impact of the preferences variable on the short end is confirmed by
Table VII. In contrast, coefficients are insignificant both in normal times and for longer
maturities. These results are particularly interesting as they constitute pronounced term-
structure effects. The increased demand for short-term and highly liquid securities within
stress periods leads first to a strongly increased level of especially short-term illiquidity
premiums (see Figure 3). Second, amplified by the increased wariness to bear risks within
stress periods, effects stemming from liquidity demand become more important.
Note that our analysis does not simply exclude credit risk effects, by definition. Instead,
the close link between credit and liquidity risk (see e.g., Ericsson and Renault, 2006;
He and Xiong, 2012) is well recognized in our approach as economy wide credit spreads
have significant explanatory power for the probability to be in the liquidity stress regime
(see Table IV). Despite this strong connection the specific nature of our data allows us
to identify effects on illiquidity premiums. As a result, we can isolate flight-to-liquidity
effects from the impacts of flight-to-quality and can conclude that they are especially
pronounced at the short end.
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Overall, our results confirm the prediction of the theoretical literature (see e.g., Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen, 2009) that the impact of changes in fundamentals on illiquidity
premiums is significantly stronger when funding is tight and the system is in stress.
Moreover, flight- to-liquidity effects contribute to declining term structures of illiquidity
premiums in crisis times. Thus, calibrating e.g., risk management models in normal times,
when the influence of fundamentals on illiquidity premiums is weak, strongly underesti-
mates the contribution of illiquidity to systematic risk and might systematically misjudge
term structure effects.
4. Robustness
In this section, we perform several robustness checks, in which we control for perceived
credit risk, selling and buying pressure from abroad, specialness of German government
bonds, and the level of interest rates. Additionally we look at the influence of the principal
component analysis on our results, incorporate possible spill-over effects between different
segments of the term structure, and account for the degree of liquidity with quoted bid-ask
spread differences allowing us to further check the separation between liquidity preferences
and inventory risk. Finally, we use month-end data and exogenously specified crises dates
to check the robustness against our regime identification methodology.
First, we include a measure for the market wide credit spread as an additional explanatory
variable to control for perceived credit risk. We use the spread between the Bloomberg
index for the yield of BBB rated industrial USD bonds and the corresponding AA index.
Note that we cannot utilize credit spreads of EUR bonds since these are available only
after August 2001. The credit spread indexes are available with different maturities, so
we add the index with the corresponding time to maturity to the respective equation
for the short-, medium-, and long-term illiquidity premium. Other than that, the model
specification is identical to that in Table VI.
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The results are presented in Table VIII. The parameter estimates for our explanatory
variables are qualitatively and quantitatively similar while all coefficients on credit spreads
are insignificant. Importantly, this evidence suggests that our results are not driven by
perceived credit risk. Together with the result, that the credit spread has significant
explanatory power for the probability to be in the liquidity stress regime (see Table IV),
this suggests that systematic credit and liquidity risk (even though heavily correlated)
are only connected over the overall state of the economy.
[Insert Table VIII about here.]
Second, we control for selling and buying pressure from abroad. There are two channels
through which effects might materialize. First, it is possible that foreign investors pull
out of everything that is not as liquid as government bonds in times of stress. This
would lead to a negative relation between foreign fund flows and the KfW-BUND spread.
Second, it might be the case that foreign investments into the German bond market
might be directed mainly into the government segment, resulting in a positive relation.
To overcome the problem of these conflicting effects, we differentiate between foreign
investments into bonds from public and non-public issuers, where Deutsche Bundesbank
classifies the KfW as a non-public issuer. We use net fund flows published by Deutsche
Bundesbank and deflate them with the consumer price index.
The results in Table IX reveal that foreign fund flows in (non-public) KfW bonds have
indeed a significant negative effect on illiquidity premiums in the stress regime while flows
in (public) government bonds are positively related to premiums. However, including
these control variables does not change any of our previous findings.
[Insert Table IX about here.]
Third, we analyze a possible influence of specialness of BUNDs arising from their deliv-
erability into the heavily traded interest rate future at Eurex. Although previous papers
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(see e.g., Ejsing and Sihvonen, 2009) conclude that these effects are close to an order of
magnitude smaller than the observed illiquidity premiums, we want to exclude an influ-
ence on our results. For the robustness check, we focus on bonds with cheapest-to-deliver
(CTD) status into the short- (BSA), medium- (Bobl), and long-term (Bund) futures. The
value of specialness is calculated as the difference in the interpolated yield derived from
the two BUNDs that enclose the CTD bond regarding its maturity minus the yield of the
CTD bond (see Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg, 2012).
According to Table X the value of specialness only significantly influences the yield spread
between agency bonds and BUNDs for short- and medium-term maturities in normal
times. Importantly, the similarity of the other results to our previous findings confirms
that they are not an artifact of the specialness of BUNDs.
[Insert Table X about here.]
Fourth, we control for the influence of the level of interest rates on illiquidity premiums.
If the marginal investor bases his investment decision on net present value, he discounts
future illiquidity premiums and therefore, equilibrium premiums will be proportional to
(1 + risklessRatet) (see e.g., Yawitz, 1977). Additionally a lower interest rate today
compared to higher interest rates in the past might increase the willingness of investors
to take liquidity risk due to search for yield (see e.g., Rajan, 2006). We control for both
effects by including the yield of all outstanding debt securities of German issuers. We
look at the relative yield level compared to the average yield of the previous three years.
The results in Table XI confirm our hypotheses regarding the average yield for medium-
and long-term illiquidity premiums in the non-stress regime. Thus, in normal times in-
vestors seem to be more willing to take liquidity risks (and therefore drive illiquidity
premiums down) when interest rates are low compared to the previous years. Controlling
for the influence of interest rates, all significances for inventory risk, liquidity differences
and liquidity preferences are unchanged compared to our main analysis.
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[Insert Table XI about here.]
Fifth, we check whether our results are governed by the use of first principal components
as explanatory variables. Since we cannot observe inventory risk and liquidity preferences
directly, the first principal component is used in our main analysis to reduce the noise
in our proxies (see e.g., Ang and Piazzesi, 2003; Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Dick-Nielsen,
Feldhütter, and Lando, 2012). To check whether this approach drives our findings, we
use maturity dependent swaption volatilities for inventory risk12 and the dividend yield
of the DAX as the measure for liquidity preferences.
Except for the fact that liquidity preferences are now even significant for medium-term
maturities, Table XII confirms our main results. Hence, the choice of not directly observ-
able principal components plays little role.
[Insert Table XII about here.]
Sixth, we control for dynamic linkages between illiquidity premiums of different maturities.
Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov (2011) find for bid-ask spreads of US treasuries,
that shocks on the liquidity of short-term bonds transmit to longer-term maturities, but
they also observe transitions in the other direction. On the other hand, Kempf, Korn, and
Uhrig-Homburg (2012) cannot detect any spill-over effects between different segments of
the term structure for illiquidity premiums of German Pfandbriefe. We control for possible
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12As a swaption with eight years swap tenor is not directly available, we linearly interpolate its implied
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with the specifications for the transition matrix in Equation (7) and the variance-covariance
matrix in (8) unchanged. We select q = 1 lag as suggested by the Bayesian Information
Criterion.
The results in Table XIII confirm our results for liquidity preferences and liquidity dif-
ferences. Interestingly, the results for inventory risk are slightly weaker. Only medium-
and long-term premiums are significantly influenced in the crisis regime. Since inventory
risk drives all maturities in our main analysis, part of its impact seems to take effect over
interdependencies between maturity segments.
[Insert Table XIII about here.]
Next, we use quoted bid-ask spread differences (see Figure 2) to account for the degree
of liquidity. This allows us to further challenge our separation between liquidity prefer-
ences and inventory risk by including interest rate volatility into our proxy for liquidity
preferences.13 In our main analysis, we employed inventory risk in the form of interest
13Interest rate volatilities, besides being measures for inventory risk that drive bid-ask spreads, are
also a natural proxy for future trading needs. So e.g., Vayanos (2004) models liquidation needs of fund
managers as the probability of the fund’s performance falling below a threshold. This probability increases
with volatility.
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rate volatility as a proxy for market liquidity and differences in the tradeable volume as
the proxy for liquidity differences between KfWs and BUNDs. We did not use bid-ask
spreads directly, since first, they are (like illiquidity premiums) measures for the price of
liquidity and therefore possibly endogenous. Second, they are only available since August
22nd, 2001 on a continuous basis for all maturities.
Nevertheless, the results for the shortened observation period in Table XIV confirm our
findings. Although the modified proxy for liquidity preferences is now statistically signifi-
cant also for longer maturities and in the normal regime, its effect on short-term maturities
in the stress regime is four times larger than in normal times and about twice as large
compared to medium-term maturities. As inventory risk in our main analysis, bid-ask
spread differences for all maturities are only significant in crises times.
[Insert Table XIV about here.]
Finally, we control for the crisis identification mechanism. As Boldin (1996) argues,
the regime identification in Markov regime-switching models is sometimes vulnerable to
relatively small changes in the data. To rule out such an effect in our study, we perform
our analysis (a) with a new data set with month-end illiquidity premia and explanatory
variables and (b) by exogenously specifying crisis and non-crisis periods.
The monthly analysis with the new data set in Table XV confirms all our main results.
In the stress regime, the influence of inventory risk is significantly higher for medium-
and long-term premiums. As before, liquidity preferences strongly influence short-term
premiums. Although their influence now extends to medium-term premiums, the effect
is more than twice as large for short-term maturities. As in the main analysis, tradeable
volume is significant for medium-term premiums within the stress regime. Long-term
maturities are now also affected.
[Insert Table XV about here.]
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For the exogenous crises specification, we define the LTCM crisis as the time between
June and October 1998 (see Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). The beginning of the dot-com
stress period is dated on May 10th, 2001, the day the ECB started cutting back interest
rates. As the end of the crisis, we select the end of the 2002-03 recession in Germany in
June 2003. The financial crisis starts in June 2007 when two of Bear Stearn’s hedge funds
ran into trouble and transforms into the European debt crisis which lasts up to the end
of the observation period.
The results in Table XVI confirm our main findings. Inventory risk is significant for all
maturities in crisis times, liquidity preferences are only significant in stress periods and
for short-term maturities. Tradable volume is now significant for short-term premiums,
but again, economic significances are below one basis point. Although conclusions do
not change when using exogenously defined crisis dates, our approach to endogenously
identify stress periods leads to a much cleaner separation of crisis- and non-crisis periods.
[Insert Table XVI about here.]
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we extract the term structure of illiquidity premiums from the spread
between two bond classes differing only in their liquidity. The availability of a data set
of homogeneous bonds spanning a large time to maturity segment over a long period
of time allows us to quantify the term structure of illiquidity premiums without strong
assumptions regarding the separation of credit and liquidity risk. We analyze this term
structure in a setting allowing for a different behavior during crisis and non-crisis times.
We find that the term structure of illiquidity premiums varies over time and is strongly
dependent on the general financial and economic situation. Option implied interest rate
volatilities as a measure for inventory risk influence all maturities, whereas our measure
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for liquidity preferences only impacts short-term maturities. The regression coefficients
are regime-switching with a significant impact only in the stress regime.
Our findings imply that systematic liquidity risk is prone to be underestimated. Through
its regime-switching behavior, the illiquidity discount increases sharply when the general
state of the economy is bad. Additionally, the sensitivity of illiquidity premiums to fun-
damentals increases in crisis times. Ignoring one of these two channels systematically
underestimates liquidity risk. From the issuer’s perspective, our results show, that in
times of crisis it is even more important to optimize the liquidity of an issue.14 This is
particularly true in the light of systematically different term structure effects in crisis and
non-crisis times.
14We have checked that issuing yields in the primary market for KfW bonds are relatively close to our
yield curves estimated from secondary market prices.
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Figure 1: Illiquidity Premiums of Different Maturities
This figure shows the development of illiquidity premiums over time. The solid line depicts
a time to maturity of two years, the dashed line provides five years, and the dotted line
eight years time to maturity. The observation period is from February 14th, 1996 to




































Figure 2: Illiquidity Premiums and Quoted Bid-Ask Spreads
This figure shows the development of illiquidity premiums (solid lines) and quoted relative
bid-ask spread differences between KfW bonds and BUNDs (dotted lines) over time. The
upper graph depicts a time to maturity of two years, the middle graph provides five years,
and the lower graph eight years time to maturity. The observation period is from February













Figure 3: Shapes of Illiquidity Premiums in Different Regimes
This figure shows the shapes of the term structure of illiquidity premiums in the stress
regime (solid line) and in the non-stress regime (dashed line). The average term structure
of illiquidity premiums in one regime is calculated by weighting the term structure of each
day with the probability to be in that regime on that date.
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Figure 4: Endogenously Derived Probability to be in the Stress Regime
This figure shows the probability of being in the stress regime (regime 2) estimated from
the Markov regime-switching Model (4)-(8) with three lags. Additionally, events anecdo-
tally linked to financial stress or low liquidity are marked. Recessions, defined as at least
two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth in Germany (Q1 1996, Q4 2002 –
Q2 2003, and Q2 2008 – Q1 2009) are shaded.
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Table I: Summary Statistics for KfW Bonds and BUNDs
This table shows summary statistics for the bonds included in the sample. The observation
period is February 14th, 1996 to September 29th, 2010.
Kreditanstalt für German government
Wiederaufbau (KfW) bonds (BUND)
Number of bonds 68 227
Average time to maturity 6.09 7.52
at issue date (in years)
Average coupon (in %) 4.13 4.90
Average issuing volume (incl. 2.99 9.83
all reopenings) (in bn EUR)
Total volume (in bn EUR) 203 2 231
Table II: Fitting Errors
This table shows the distribution of observations over different maturity segments, average
root mean square errors (RMSE), and mean estimation errors of the yield curve estimation
in Equation (2). The observation period is February 14th, 1996 to September 29th, 2010.
Distribution of Average RMSE Mean estimation
observations error
KfW BUND KfW BUND KfW BUND
T ≤ 2 years 30.3% 34.9% 9.2 bps 5.0 bps 0.6 bps −0.4 bps
2 years < T ≤ 5 years 34.6% 30.2% 5.8 bps 4.3 bps −1.1 bps −0.2 bps
5 years < T ≤ 8 years 17.2% 13.0% 4.0 bps 3.9 bps 0.2 bps 1.8 bps
8 years < T 18.0% 21.9% 3.5 bps 6.9 bps 0.9 bps −0.3 bps
All 100.0% 100.0% 7.3 bps 5.5 bps 0.0 bps 0.0 bps
37
Table III: Estimation Results for Markov Regime-Switching AR Model
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (4)-(8) with
three lags. White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate signifi-
cance at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is February 14th, 1996 to September
29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 16.4 bps 14.1 bps 14.4 bps 31.6 bps 25.0 bps 25.6 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.0247 0.0209 0.0201 0.0757 0.0617 0.0511












parameters 0.274 0.655 0.6917 0.297 0.4907 0.7603




Constant 0.0072∗ 0.0063∗ 0.0056∗ 0.0156∗ 0.0162∗∗ 0.0139∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0048)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.5955
∗∗ 0.6675∗∗ 0.7017∗∗ 0.661∗∗ 0.5876∗∗ 0.579∗∗
(0.0584) (0.0436) (0.0523) (0.0724) (0.0629) (0.0617)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1788
∗∗ 0.1488∗∗ 0.2104∗∗ 0.2349∗∗ 0.1653∗ 0.1903∗∗
(0.0556) (0.0462) (0.0567) (0.0736) (0.0691) (0.0727)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1754
∗∗ 0.1274∗∗ 0.0362 0.0639 0.2∗∗ 0.1965∗∗
(0.0454) (0.0355) (0.048) (0.076) (0.0666) (0.068)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4976.02 761 -9876.05 -9658.18
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Table IV: Model for the Probability of being in the Stress Regime




) of the probability to be in the stress regime P Stresst . The modification term
0.5
N
(with N = 761 as the to-
tal number of observations) ensures that zt is defined for probabilities P Stresst of 0 and 1 (see e.g., Cox, 1970; Acharya, Amihud, and
Bharath, 2010). P Stresst is estimated from the Markov regime-switching Model (4)-(8) with three lags. This variable is regressed
on different economic and financial sector variables as described in the text. Standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **
indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is February 14th, 1996 to September 29th, 2010 (761 weekly
observations).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant −2.0021∗∗ −1.9169∗∗ −6.5536∗∗ −0.1791 −2.8417∗∗ −5.1469∗∗ −6.8565∗∗ −4.263∗∗ −6.2873∗∗
(0.1767) (0.1779) (0.4212) (0.2194) (0.2545) (0.2494) (0.4262) (0.2104) (0.5143)
Reces. Dummy Germ. 5.0563∗∗ 0.6463
(0.5001) (0.5958)
Negative Return DAX 4.7216∗∗ 0.2118
(0.5232) (0.5977)
VDAX New 20.2211∗∗ 21.9046∗∗ 8.7844∗∗
(1.5225) (1.5805) (2.1382)
ZEW German Expec. −0.038∗∗ −0.0069
(0.0045) (0.0052)
TED Spread 2.837∗∗ 0.6231
(0.3661) (0.4345)
Credit Spread 5.6568∗∗ 2.0641∗∗
(0.3032) (0.6251)
Capitalization Bank. Syst. −0.0833∗∗ −0.0818∗∗
(0.023) (0.0271)
Systemic Stress 16.1942∗∗ 6.7267∗∗
(0.8539) (1.9347)
Adjusted R2 0.1176 0.0957 0.1875 0.085 0.0721 0.3135 0.2003 0.3206 0.373
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Table V: Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables
This table shows summary statistics for the variables included in the analysis. invRisk
refers to the first principal component of orthogonalized swaption volatilities of different
maturities, trblV ol(T ) measures the tradable volume of the representative KfW bond
compared to its BUND counterpart with T years to maturity, and liquPref is the first
principal component of the VDAX New, the TED spread, and the dividend yield of the
DAX. The observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010 (700 weekly
observations).
Mean Standard Minimum Median Maximum
Deviation
invRisk 0 2.5519 -3.9135 -0.4477 14.9636
trblV ol(2) 0.2117 0.0787 0.0838 0.2108 0.3782
trblV ol(5) 0.2014 0.0544 0.0923 0.2051 0.3031
trblV ol(8) 0.2321 0.0466 0.1336 0.2372 0.3328
liquPref 0 1.2989 -1.6635 -0.2836 7.8201
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Table VI: Estimation Results for Markov Regime-Switching AR with Exoge-
nous Variables
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (9), (10),
(11), (7), and (8) with p = 3. White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *,
** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is May 7th, 1997
to September 29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 16.6 bps 14.0 bps 14.4 bps 31.5 bps 24.8 bps 25.4 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.0239 0.0216 0.0204 0.0709 0.0595 0.0501












parameters 0.2892 0.6544 0.7052 0.3001 0.4904 0.7623




Constant 0.0159∗∗ 0.0087 0.0045 0.0566∗∗ 0.0614∗∗ 0.0475∗
(0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0208)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.5697
∗∗ 0.6741∗∗ 0.7023∗∗ 0.539∗∗ 0.5136∗∗ 0.5248∗∗
(0.0558) (0.0482) (0.0537) (0.0713) (0.0667) (0.0633)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1829
∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.2349∗∗ 0.1834∗∗ 0.1213 0.1477∗
(0.0522) (0.0486) (0.0576) (0.0711) (0.0685) (0.0715)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1772
∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.0158 0.0499 0.1784∗∗ 0.1945∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0357) (0.0517) (0.067) (0.0641) (0.0695)
invRiskt 0.0027 0.0004 −0.0006 0.0078
∗ 0.0105∗∗ 0.0094∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0029)
trblV olt(T ) −0.0035 0.0042 0.0095 −0.0523 −0.1373
∗ −0.0898
(0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0274) (0.052) (0.0564) (0.0823)
liquPreft 0.003 0.0043 0.0031 0.0237
∗∗ 0.003 −0.0015
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0072) (0.0057) (0.0055)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4539.48 700 -8966.96 -8650.57
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Table VII: Regime-Switching Behavior of Economic Determinants
This table shows the differences of the parameter estimates between the two regimes.
The null hypothesis H0 is, that parameter estimates are identical in both regimes, i.e.,
the difference is 0. The Wald chi-squared statistics W = (Rα̂− r)′(RV̂ R′)−1(Rα̂− r)′ are
given in square brackets, where R and r define the hypotheses for the parameter vector
α. *, ** indicate rejection of H0 at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is May
7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Differences between regimes
Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
Constant : a0,s=1 − a0,s=2 0.0407
∗∗ 0.0527∗∗ 0.043
[6.9765] [10.9551] [3.6066]
illiqt−1(T ) : b1,s=1 − b1,s=2 −0.0307 −0.1605 −0.1775
[0.0983] [3.305] [3.7979]
illiqt−2(T ) : b2,s=1 − b2,s=2 0.0005 −0.0307 −0.0872
[0.0000] [0.1172] [0.7633]
illiqt−3(T ) : b3,s=1 − b3,s=2 −0.1282 0.0624 0.1787
[2.4831] [0.6591] [3.5548]
invRiskt : a1,s=1 − a1,s=2 0.0051 0.0101
∗∗ 0.01∗∗
[1.9553] [8.3308] [8.4079]
trblV olt(T ) : a2,s=1 − a2,s=2 −0.0488 −0.1415
∗ −0.0993
[0.7402] [5.3063] [1.1969]




Table VIII: Robustness Check: Credit Spread
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (9), (10), (11),
(7), and (8) with p = 3 including an additional variable controlling for perceived credit
risk. Creditt(T ) refers to the spread between the Bloomberg index for the yield of BBB
rated industrial USD bonds and the corresponding AA index with T years to maturity.
White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the
5% or 1% level. The observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 16.6 bps 14.0 bps 14.4 bps 31.5 bps 24.8 bps 25.4 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.0241 0.0216 0.0204 0.0711 0.0596 0.0503












parameters 0.2951 0.6611 0.7052 0.3086 0.5027 0.7636




Constant 0.0167∗ 0.012 0.0109 0.0525∗∗ 0.0635∗∗ 0.0463
(0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0094) (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0249)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.5664
∗∗ 0.672∗∗ 0.7048∗∗ 0.5402∗∗ 0.5018∗∗ 0.5197∗∗
(0.0506) (0.0483) (0.0542) (0.0711) (0.0672) (0.0641)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1847
∗∗ 0.1576∗∗ 0.2405∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.1121 0.1407
(0.049) (0.0492) (0.058) (0.0716) (0.0689) (0.0726)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1744
∗∗ 0.1227∗∗ 0.0126 0.0717 0.1676∗∗ 0.1963∗∗
(0.0387) (0.0339) (0.0505) (0.0675) (0.0631) (0.0696)
invRiskt 0.0028 0.0008 0.0001 0.0075
∗ 0.0108∗∗ 0.0095∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0029)
trblV olt(T ) −0.0086 0.0214 0.0123 0.0058 −0.1891
∗∗ −0.1021
(0.0189) (0.0219) (0.0279) (0.0567) (0.0638) (0.0855)
liquPreft 0.0025 0.0057
∗ 0.0042 0.0247∗∗ 0.0014 −0.0022
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0073) (0.0059) (0.0055)
Creditt(T ) 0.0014 −0.0111 −0.0103 −0.0195 0.0177 0.0077
(0.0098) (0.0093) (0.0095) (0.0141) (0.0159) (0.0135)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4543.63 700 -8963.26 -8612.97
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Table IX: Robustness Check: Selling and Buying Pressure from Abroad
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (9), (10),
(11), (7), and (8) with p = 3 including two additional explanatory variables controlling
for selling and buying pressure from abroad. ForeignPub (ForNonPub) is the deflated
net investments of foreigners in bonds of public (non-public) issuers from Germany in
trillions of Euros (in prices of 2005). Monthly values of this variable are from Deutsche
Bundesbank and used for all weeks of the respective month. White’s (1982) standard
errors are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The
observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 16.5 bps 14.0 bps 14.5 bps 31.7 bps 24.8 bps 25.3 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.0243 0.0218 0.0204 0.0702 0.0586 0.0496












parameters 0.2958 0.6619 0.7045 0.2924 0.483 0.7605




Constant 0.0149∗ 0.0079 0.0035 0.0746∗∗ 0.0802∗∗ 0.0595∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0169) (0.017) (0.0224)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.5584
∗∗ 0.6659∗∗ 0.6986∗∗ 0.5206∗∗ 0.4897∗∗ 0.5035∗∗
(0.0624) (0.0531) (0.0527) (0.0715) (0.0673) (0.0654)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1918
∗∗ 0.1582∗∗ 0.2356∗∗ 0.1653∗ 0.1044 0.1365
(0.0506) (0.0486) (0.0657) (0.0709) (0.0685) (0.0758)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1849
∗∗ 0.1242∗∗ 0.0257 0.0315 0.1506∗ 0.1728∗
(0.0416) (0.038) (0.0587) (0.0651) (0.0629) (0.0696)
invRiskt 0.0029 0.0008 −0.0002 0.0071
∗ 0.0093∗∗ 0.0084∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0032)
trblV olt(T ) −0.0032 0.0057 0.0102 −0.0522 −0.1589
∗∗ −0.0974
(0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0281) (0.0536) (0.0578) (0.0837)
liquPreft 0.0032 0.0043 0.003 0.0273
∗∗ 0.0068 0.0014
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0076) (0.0064) (0.0065)
ForeignPub 0.169 0.3006 0.3196 0.5184 1.1894∗ 1.1294∗
(0.1931) (0.1829) (0.1886) (0.6899) (0.5688) (0.4949)
ForNonPub 0.0108 −0.0613 −0.0323 −1.8322∗∗ −1.8724∗∗ −1.4013∗
(0.2382) (0.2307) (0.229) (0.6782) (0.6697) (0.6434)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4550.2 700 -8964.39 -8580.22
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Table X: Robustness Check: Specialness
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (9), (10),
(11), (7), and (8) with p = 3 including an additional variable controlling for specialness of
BUNDs. Specialt(T ) refers to the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) premium for the bond which
is CTD into the BSA, Bobl, and Bund futures for T = 2, T = 5, and T = 8 respectively.
It is calculated as the yield spread between the interpolated yield derived from the two
BUNDs that enclose the CTD bond regarding its maturity minus the yield of the CTD
bond. White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance
at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 16.6 bps 14.0 bps 14.5 bps 31.6 bps 24.8 bps 25.3 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.0241 0.0219 0.0205 0.071 0.0593 0.0502












parameters 0.2969 0.6635 0.7129 0.2994 0.4898 0.7625




Constant 0.0159∗∗ 0.0095 0.0048 0.0563∗∗ 0.0638∗∗ 0.0462∗
(0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0226)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.5691
∗∗ 0.6698∗∗ 0.698∗∗ 0.5393∗∗ 0.5081∗∗ 0.5198∗∗
(0.0526) (0.0451) (0.0551) (0.071) (0.0678) (0.065)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1849
∗∗ 0.1555∗∗ 0.2387∗∗ 0.1856∗∗ 0.1167 0.1464∗
(0.0471) (0.0454) (0.0576) (0.0707) (0.0687) (0.0711)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1737
∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.0149 0.0484 0.1769∗∗ 0.1976∗∗
(0.0413) (0.0346) (0.0503) (0.0669) (0.0641) (0.0701)
invRiskt 0.0026 0.0005 −0.0007 0.0078
∗ 0.0107∗∗ 0.0095∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0029)
trblV olt(T ) −0.0027 −0.0003 0.009 −0.0522 −0.1417
∗ −0.0823
(0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0266) (0.0526) (0.0576) (0.0916)
liquPreft 0.0027 0.0039 0.0031 0.0236
∗∗ 0.0043 −0.0013
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0072) (0.0058) (0.0055)
Specialt(T ) 0.05
∗∗ 0.0535∗ 0.0389 0.0132 −0.1235 0.0201
(0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0419) (0.0678) (0.0649) (0.1156)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4546.65 700 -8969.30 -8619.02
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Table XI: Robustness Check: Level of Interest Rates
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (9), (10),
(11), (7), and (8) with p = 3 including an additional explanatory variable controlling
for interest rate effects. AverY ld is the yield of all outstanding bonds divided by the
average yield of the previous three years (data from Deutsche Bundesbank). White’s
(1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or
1% level. The observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 16.7 bps 14.1 bps 14.6 bps 31.7 bps 24.9 bps 25.3 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.0242 0.0218 0.0203 0.0713 0.0598 0.0502












parameters 0.3089 0.6677 0.7103 0.2996 0.4888 0.7599




Constant 0.0255∗ −0.01 −0.0244∗ 0.0821∗ 0.0804∗∗ 0.0544
(0.0119) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0338) (0.0311) (0.0294)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.562
∗∗ 0.6594∗∗ 0.6801∗∗ 0.5362∗∗ 0.5134∗∗ 0.5235∗∗
(0.0504) (0.0475) (0.0525) (0.0715) (0.0671) (0.0622)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1811
∗∗ 0.1491∗∗ 0.2294∗∗ 0.1807∗ 0.1205 0.1488∗
(0.0503) (0.0469) (0.0505) (0.0704) (0.0686) (0.0717)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1697
∗∗ 0.1182∗∗ 0.0266 0.0476 0.1771∗∗ 0.1938∗∗
(0.038) (0.0321) (0.0457) (0.0672) (0.0637) (0.0701)
invRiskt 0.0036
∗ 0.0007 −0.0007 0.0078∗ 0.0103∗∗ 0.0093∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0028)
trblV olt(T ) −0.0184 −0.0109 0.0016 −0.0622 −0.1359
∗ −0.073
(0.0206) (0.0212) (0.029) (0.0553) (0.0577) (0.0804)
liquPreft 0.0024 0.0049 0.0043 0.0247
∗∗ 0.0035 −0.0013
(0.003) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0073) (0.0059) (0.0056)
AverY ld −0.035 0.0257∗ 0.0354∗∗ −0.0231 −0.0204 −0.0119
(0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0279) (0.028) (0.0227)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4551.81 700 -8979.63 -8629.35
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Table XII: Robustness Check: Influence of Principal Component Analysis
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (9), (10), (11),
(7), and (8) with p = 3 with invRiskt(T ) instead of the first principal component invRiskt
and DivY ieldDax instead of liquPref . invRiskt(T ) is the implied volatility of swaptions
with an option tenor of three months and a swap tenor of T years orthogonalized with the
three months Euribor (data from Bloomberg). DivY ldDax is the value weighted dividend
yield of the members of the German stock market index DAX (data from Bloomberg).
White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the
5% or 1% level. The observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 16.6 bps 14.1 bps 14.7 bps 31.7 bps 24.7 bps 25.1 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.0246 0.0222 0.0207 0.0724 0.0585 0.0502












parameters 0.304 0.669 0.7139 0.252 0.4439 0.7626




Constant 0.0082 0.0063 0.0079 −0.0139 0.0017 0.0049
(0.0089) (0.0087) (0.009) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0293)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.5789
∗∗ 0.6821∗∗ 0.7064∗∗ 0.5635∗∗ 0.4955∗∗ 0.5147∗∗
(0.0568) (0.0503) (0.0564) (0.0726) (0.0705) (0.0645)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1782
∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.2457∗∗ 0.1762∗ 0.1032 0.131
(0.0542) (0.0469) (0.0614) (0.0753) (0.067) (0.0725)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1717
∗∗ 0.1164∗∗ 0.0117 0.0102 0.1212 0.1623∗
(0.0413) (0.0338) (0.0516) (0.0733) (0.0657) (0.0739)
invRiskt(T ) 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.003
∗∗ 0.0027∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.001)
trblV olt(T ) −0.0101 0.0057 −0.0028 −0.0799 −0.1708
∗∗ −0.0292
(0.0166) (0.0213) (0.0304) (0.0561) (0.0564) (0.0915)
DivY ldDaxt 0.0031 −0.0014 −0.0014 0.0336
∗∗ 0.0332∗∗ 0.0153
(0.0041) (0.004) (0.0041) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0102)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4529.64 700 -8947.28 -8630.9
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Table XIII: Robustness Check: Dynamic Linkages
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (12), (13),
(14), (7), and (8) with p = 3 and q = 1. White’s (1982) standard errors are given in
parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is
May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 16.8 bps 14.1 bps 14.6 bps 31.4 bps 24.8 bps 25.2 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.024 0.0212 0.0202 0.0702 0.0572 0.0491












parameters 0.2759 0.6468 0.704 0.2899 0.4849 0.7628




Constant 0.0308 0.0263 0.0195 0.0303 0.052∗∗ 0.0352
(0.0314) (0.0241) (0.0326) (0.0242) (0.0183) (0.0262)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.5222
∗∗ 0.641∗∗ 0.7695∗∗ 0.4672∗∗ 0.3801∗∗ 0.5988∗∗
(0.1087) (0.0668) (0.08) (0.0971) (0.1263) (0.0989)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1724 0.137
∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.1679∗ 0.0662 0.0925
(0.0889) (0.0652) (0.0621) (0.0786) (0.0713) (0.0794)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1695
∗ 0.1108∗ 0.0182 0.017 0.1033 0.155∗
(0.079) (0.0443) (0.0549) (0.07) (0.0646) (0.0675)
illiqt−1(2) −0.0857 −0.0449 0.0246 0.0411
(0.0654) (0.0899) (0.051) (0.051)
illiqt−1(5) −0.0329 −0.0493 0.1142 0.0411
(0.0974) (0.0584) (0.1578) (0.0834)
illiqt−1(8) 0.0428 0.0826
∗ 0.0964 0.3199∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0383) (0.1155) (0.103)
invRiskt 0.0044 0.002 0.0002 0.0052 0.0074
∗ 0.0065∗
(0.005) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0032)
trblV olt(T ) −0.0268 −0.0299 −0.0341 0.0142 −0.1756
∗ −0.0839
(0.0722) (0.059) (0.0846) (0.077) (0.0726) (0.1012)
liquPreft 0.003 0.0051 0.0032 0.0252
∗∗ 0.0032 −0.0045
(0.0058) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0079) (0.0061) (0.0054)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4573.51 700 -9011.02 -8626.84
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Table XIV: Robustness Check: Bid-Ask Spread and Separation of Liquidity
Preferences and Inventory Risk
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (9), (10),
(11), (7), and (8) with p = 3 with BidAskDifrt(T ) instead of liquPreft and trblV olt(T ).
BidAskDifrt(T ) refers to quoted relative bid-ask spread differences between KfW bonds
and BUNDs (see also Figure 2). liquPrefIntV olt substitutes liquPreft in (9)-(11) and
is the first principal component of the VDAX New, the TED spread, the dividend yield
of the DAX, and the five year swaption volatility orthogonalized with the three months
Euribor (data from Bloomberg). White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses.
*, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is August 22nd,
2001 to September 30th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 15.7 bps 9.9 bps 10.6 bps 32.9 bps 25.1 bps 25.4 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.0215 0.0168 0.0128 0.0702 0.0576 0.0464












parameters 0.135 0.5987 0.6184 0.2901 0.4729 0.7621




Constant 0.0247∗∗ 0.0121∗∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0338∗∗ 0.0222∗∗ 0.0245∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0095) (0.0071) (0.0054)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.567
∗∗ 0.6179∗∗ 0.4348∗∗ 0.5006∗∗ 0.4778∗∗ 0.5048∗∗
(0.0826) (0.0477) (0.0751) (0.0724) (0.0678) (0.0625)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1102
∗ 0.1107∗∗ 0.2555∗∗ 0.1939∗∗ 0.1297 0.1545∗
(0.0461) (0.0361) (0.0496) (0.0716) (0.069) (0.0764)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.115
∗ 0.1462∗∗ 0.1412 0.0361 0.1089 0.1273
(0.0586) (0.0489) (0.0722) (0.0711) (0.0662) (0.0677)
BidAskDifrt(T ) 0.1216 −0.0127 −0.0179 0.1585
∗ 0.1654∗∗ 0.0905∗∗
(0.0626) (0.0355) (0.0277) (0.0683) (0.0431) (0.033)
liquPrefIntV olt 0.0065
∗∗ 0.0036∗ 0.0045∗ 0.0289∗∗ 0.0164∗∗ 0.0114∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0055) (0.0037) (0.003)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
2996.55 476 -5893.09 -5629.89
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Table XV: Robustness Check: Monthly Analysis
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (9), (10),
(11), (7), and (8) with p = 3. White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *,
** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is May 31th, 1997
to September 30th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 13.2 bps 10.5 bps 10.4 bps 41.0 bps 34.6 bps 36.0 bps
premium(T)
σ 0.031 0.0297 0.0311 0.0755 0.0671 0.0641












parameters −0.1192 0.0324 0.5049 0.1708 0.4538 0.8916




Constant 0.1242∗∗ 0.0267 0.0203 0.141∗∗ 0.2786∗∗ 0.2786∗∗
(0.0468) (0.0202) (0.0265) (0.0323) (0.0539) (0.0425)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.4358
∗∗ 0.4335∗∗ 0.4358∗∗ 0.5695∗∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.4736∗∗
(0.095) (0.0845) (0.0953) (0.0905) (0.1118) (0.1224)
illiqt−2(T ) −0.1319 0.1672 0.0355 −0.3715
∗∗ −0.0642 −0.0917
(0.1487) (0.0995) (0.0859) (0.1099) (0.087) (0.1158)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1397 0.1873
∗∗ 0.2652∗∗ 0.2041∗∗ 0.1844∗ 0.1857∗
(0.1199) (0.0722) (0.0744) (0.0644) (0.0793) (0.0834)
invRiskt 0.014
∗ −0.0012 −0.0013 0.0122∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.0148∗
(0.0066) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0059)
trblV olt(T ) −0.163 −0.0226 0.0271 0.0711 −0.7903
∗∗ −0.6082∗∗
(0.0837) (0.0685) (0.1137) (0.1836) (0.2732) (0.1145)
liquPreft 0.0022 0.0088 0.0093 0.0752
∗∗ 0.0313∗∗ 0.0202
(0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0181) (0.0103) (0.0129)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
921.36 161 -1730.72 -1496.64
50
Table XVI: Robustness Check: Exogenous Crises Specification
This table shows the results of the estimation of Model (9) - (11) with exogenously speci-
fied stress periods (LTCM-crisis: June, 1st to October 31st, 1998; burst of dot-com bubble:
May 10th, 2001 to June 30th, 2003; financial and subsequent European debt crisis: June
1st, 2007 to September 29th, 2010). Newey and West’s (1987) standard errors with five
lags are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The total
observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Non Crisis Crisis
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=8 yr.
mean illiq. 14.1 bps 12.0 bps 12.8 bps 32.6 bps 25.7 bps 25.9 bps
premium(T)
Constant 0.0816∗∗ 0.0165 0.0141 0.0633∗∗ 0.046∗∗ −0.0055
(0.0125) (0.0098) (0.0115) (0.016) (0.014) (0.0253)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.2999
∗∗ 0.7208∗∗ 0.6863∗∗ 0.5861∗∗ 0.6742∗∗ 0.7333∗∗
(0.0695) (0.0555) (0.0834) (0.0678) (0.0675) (0.0585)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1404
∗∗ −0.0102 0.1399 0.2208∗∗ 0.1792∗ 0.2246∗
(0.0508) (0.1104) (0.08) (0.0814) (0.0797) (0.0901)
illiqt−3(T ) 0.1846
∗∗ 0.2275∗ 0.1429 0.0218 0.0275 −0.0654
(0.0555) (0.1021) (0.0839) (0.0789) (0.0538) (0.0723)
invRiskt 0.0088
∗∗ 0.0025 0.0017 0.0059∗ 0.0061∗∗ 0.0038∗
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0019)
trblV olt(T ) −0.0782
∗∗ −0.0164 −0.0318 −0.1319∗∗ −0.1196∗ 0.0939
(0.0295) (0.0368) (0.0542) (0.0485) (0.0527) (0.1046)
liquPreft 0.005 0.0042 0.0018 0.0183
∗∗ 0.0033 0.004
(0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0064) (0.0043) (0.0039)
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